Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series

Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference
Papers

2016

The Conventions of Constitutional Amendment in
Canada
Richard Albert
ralbert@bc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Albert, Richard, "The Conventions of Constitutional Amendment in Canada" (2016). Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series. 170.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/olsrps/170

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference Papers at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.

OSGOODE HALL LAW SCHOOL
LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

Research Paper No. 38

Volume 12, Issue 8, 2016

The Conventions of Constitutional Amendment in Canada
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 53(2), 2016, Forthcoming.

Richard Albert

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2705669

Further information and a collection of publications from the Osgoode Hall Law School Legal Studies Research Paper
Series can be found at:
http://www.ssrn.com/link/Osgoode-Hall-LEG.html

Editors:
Editor-in-Chief: Carys J. Craig (Associate Dean of Research & Institutional Relations and Associate Professor, Osgoode
Hall Law School, York University, Toronto)
Production Editor: Kiana Blake (Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto)

Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 38
Vol. 12/ Issue. 8/ (2016)

The Conventions of Constitutional Amendment in Canada
Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 53(2), 2016, Forthcoming.
Richard Albert
Abstract:
Commentators have suggested that the unsuccessful national referendum to ratify the 1992
Charlottetown Accord has created an expectation of popular participation requiring
national referendal consultation in major reforms to the Constitution of Canada. In this
Article, I inquire whether federal political actors are bound by a constitutional convention
of national referendal consultation for formal amendments to the basic structure of the
Constitution of Canada. Drawing from the Supreme Court of Canada’s Patriation Reference,
I suggest that we cannot know whether federal political actors are bound by such a
convention until they are confronted with the question whether or not to hold a national
referendum in connection with a change to the Constitution’s basic structure. I conclude by
suggesting, perhaps counterintuitively, that layering a conventional requirement of
national referendal consultation onto the existing requirements for formal amendments to
the Constitution’s basic structure could well undermine democracy, despite our common
association of referenda with democratic legitimacy. I suggest instead that a national
referendum should be an alternative path, not an additional step, in constitutional
amendment.
Keywords:
Constitutional Amendment, Constitutional Conventions, Constitution of Canada,
Referendum, Jennings Test, Patriation Reference, Secession Reference, Senate Reform
Reference, Charlottetown Accord, Meech Lake Accord
Author(s):
Richard Albert
Boston College Law School
E: richard.albert@bc.edu

BO S TO N
COLLEGE

LAW

BOSTON COLLEGE LAW SCHOOL
LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

RESEARCH PAPER 387
December 19, 2015

The Conventions of Constitutional Amendment in
Canada

Richard Albert
Associate Professor
Boston College Law School

53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL (forthcoming 2016) (peer-reviewed)

—IN REVISION—

THE CONVENTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IN CANADA
RICHARD ALBERT†
Commentators have suggested that the unsuccessful national referendum to ratify the 1992
Charlottetown Accord has created an expectation of popular participation requiring national
referendal consultation in major reforms to the Constitution of Canada. In this Article, I inquire
whether federal political actors are bound by a constitutional convention of national referendal
consultation for formal amendments to the basic structure of the Constitution of Canada. Drawing
from the Supreme Court of Canada’s Patriation Reference, I suggest that we cannot know whether
federal political actors are bound by such a convention until they are confronted with the question
whether or not to hold a national referendum in connection with a change to the Constitution’s
basic structure. I conclude by suggesting, perhaps counterintuitively, that layering a conventional
requirement of national referendal consultation onto the existing requirements for formal
amendments to the Constitution’s basic structure could well undermine democracy, despite our
common association of referenda with democratic legitimacy. I suggest instead that a national
referendum should be an alternative path, not an additional step, in constitutional amendment.
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I.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT CONVENTIONS

INTRODUCTION

Codified constitutions commonly entrench formal amendment rules authorizing alterations
to their text.1 These rules, however, are susceptible to informal changes, as I am currently
demonstrating with reference to constitutions across the democratic world,2 and as I have already
shown in Canada, where the Constitution’s escalating structure of formal amendment has been
modified by judicial interpretation, federal and provincial law, and also by political practice.3
Partly codified and uncodified, the Constitution of Canada is peculiarly susceptible to informal
changes that arise when new constitutional conventions fill or create a void in the constitutional
text, or when they refine or substitute parts of the text.4 Two examples in Canada are the twin
conventions that now exist against using the federal powers of reservation and disallowance—
powers that today nonetheless remain textually entrenched.5 The susceptibility of the Constitution
of Canada to informal changes like these raises an important question: could the Constitution’s
formal amendment rules be informally changed by a constitutional convention?
For much of Canadian history and with only a few exceptions,6 the power to formally
amend the codified Constitution of Canada—the Constitution Act, 1867,7 a statute passed by the
Imperial Parliament—belonged to the Parliament of the United Kingdom.8 Canada finally acquired
the power to formally amend its own constitution more than a century after Confederation, when
the Constitution Act, 1982 created an escalating structure of formal amendment that was fully and
independently deployable by Canadian political actors.9 It took roughly fifteen unsuccessful
attempts over the course of six decades to reach agreement on the intricate design of those rules.10
Soon after the coming-into-force of the Constitution Act, 1982, Canada’s new formal
amendment rules became the subject of major constitutional reform efforts in the 1987 Meech

1

See Francesco Giovannoni, “Amendment Rules in Constitutions” (2003) 115 Pub. Choice 37 at 37.
Richard Albert, The Democratic Values of Constitutional Amendment (forthcoming with Oxford University Press).
3
Richard Albert, “Constitutional Amendment by Stealth” (2015) 60 McGill L.J. 673 at 689-92.
4
Richard Albert, “How Unwritten Constitutional Norms Change Written Constitution” (forthcoming 2016) 38 Dublin
Univ. L.J., available online at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2628460 (last visited December 1, 2015).
5
See Richard Albert, “Constitutional Amendment by Constitutional Desuetude” (2014) 62 Am. J. Comp. L. 641 at
660-69.
6
See Richard Albert, “Amending Constitutional Amendment Rules” (2015) 13 Int’l J. Const. L. 655 at 673 (identifying
the exceptions to the general rule that only the Imperial Parliament could amend the Constitution).
7
The Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 (U.K.) (hereinafter “Constitution Act, 1867”).
8
See Richard S. Kay, “Constitutional Chrononomy” (2000) 13 Ratio Juris 31 at 42-43.
9
See Procedure for Amending Constitution of Canada, Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) (“hereinafter Constitution Act, 1982”).
10
See Richard H. Leach, “Implications for Federalism of the Reformed Constitution of Canada” (1982) 45 L. &
Contemp. Probs. 149 at 156. It is unclear, however, whether the rules were intended to be permanent. The Constitution
Act, 1982 instructed Canada’s first ministers to meet within fifteen years in an intergovernmental conference to review
the Constitution’s new amendment rules. See Constitution Act, 1982, Part V, s. 49. Canada’s first ministers met on
June 20-21, 1996, to review the Constitution’s formal amendment rules. It is reported that the discussion on this subject
“was of short duration and there was no decision on how further discussion might be pursued on this matter.” Canadian
Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat, First Ministers’ Conferences 1906-2004, at 103, available online:
http://www.scics.gc.ca/CMFiles/fmp_e.pdf (last visited December 1, 2015).
2
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Lake Accord11 and the 1992 Charlottetown Accord.12 Both efforts failed, the former due in part to
a time limitation for legislative ratification13 and the latter as a result of outright public
repudiation.14 In an interesting twist, however, these formal amendment failures may have set into
motion an informal constitutional change to Canada’s formal amendment rules, driven by the
creation of a new constitutional convention.15 Therefore in failing to reform Canada’s formal
amendment rules, political actors may have inadvertently altered them by incorporating into the
tradition of Canada’s uncodified constitution a conventional requirement of national referendal
consultation—an unwritten rule that is by definition altogether absent from the rules textuallyprescribed in the Constitution Act, 1982 for formally amending the Constitution of Canada.16
Commentators have suggested that the unsuccessful national referendum held in
connection with the Charlottetown Accord has created an expectation of popular participation
requiring national referendal consultation in future major constitutional reforms.17 The argument
seems compelling: in 1992, the federal government chose to require a national consultative
referendum as part of the amendment process to ratify the Charlottetown Accord, and must
therefore do so again in the future because the Charlottetown referendum has created a precedent
that binds federal actors.18 The question, then, is whether the federal government’s decision to hold
a referendum on the Charlottetown Accord has since matured into a constitutional convention.19 If
indeed the Charlottetown referendum is today a binding precedent entrenched as a convention in
the unwritten Constitution of Canada, this change should be understood as an informal amendment
to the written Constitution of Canada since Canada’s formal amendment rules do not require direct
popular participation to either propose or ratify an amendment.20 They require only federal or
provincial legislative action, or both in tandem, to formally amend the constitution.21
In this Article, I draw from constitutional law, history and theory to test the argument that
the use of the referendum in the Charlottetown Accord has matured into a constitutional
convention. I inquire specifically whether there now exists a convention that binds federal actors
to hold a national referendum for any formal amendment to the basic structure of the Constitution
of Canada.22 I explore whether the convention operates in the context of what Peter Russell defines
as “mega constitutional politics.” Russell coined the term to refer to amendments that “address the

11

The 1987 Constitutional Accord, Ottawa, Ontario, June 3, 1987 (“Meech Lake Accord”).
Consensus Report on the Constitution: Final Text, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, August 28, 1992
(hereinafter “Charlottetown Accord”).
13
See infra text accompanying notes 33-42.
14
See infra text accompanying notes 55-65.
15
See infra text accompanying notes 94-101.
16
See Constitution Act, 1982, Part V, ss. 38-49.
17
See infra note 94.
18
See infra text accompanying notes 94-99.
19
In this Article, I will follow the Canadian practice of using the term referendum to refer both to binding and nonbinding direct popular votes, although the scholarly literature distinguishes between a referendum, which is binding,
and a plebiscite, which is non-binding. See Don Rowat, “Our Referendums are not Direct Democracy” (1998) 21 Can.
Parl. Rev. 25 at 25. I will refer variously to either binding or non-binding referenda.
20
See Constitution Act, 1982, Part V, ss. 38-49.
21
Ibid.
22
See Peter H. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People? (University of Toronto
Press 1992) at 75.
12
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very nature of the political community on which the constitution is based”23 and that have a
“tendency to touch citizens’ sense of identity and self-worth.”24 He specifies that “mega
constitutional politics, whether directed towards comprehensive constitutional change or not, is
concerned with reaching agreement on the identity and fundamental principles of the body
politic.”25 Mega constitutional politics, then, seek major reforms to the framework of government.
The Constitution of Canada’s escalating structure of formal amendment identifies which
matters trigger mega constitutional politics.26 Amending the matters amendable pursuant to the
default multilateral amendment procedure entrenched in Section 38 as well as those amendable
pursuant only to the unanimity amendment procedure entrenched in Section 41 would result in a
fundamental change to the polity, to Canadian identity, and to federal-provincial relations. In short,
they would change the basic structure of the Constitution of Canada. These are the amendable
matters for which I explore whether a federal convention of national referendal consultation has
taken root. I conclude that we cannot know now whether such a convention has developed—not
until federal political actors are again confronted with the question whether or not to hold a national
referendum in connection with a change to the basic structure of the Constitution of Canada.27
I begin in Part II by returning to 1982. I trace very briefly the constitutional and political
context surrounding the Charlottetown Accord and I explain the impetus urging political actors to
initiate a referendum. In Part III, I examine the role and development of conventions in Canadian
constitutional amendment in order to then evaluate, in Part IV, whether the Charlottetown
referendum has created a binding federal precedent amounting to a constitutional convention on
national referendal consulation for major constitutional reforms. I also return again to 1982 to
suggest that the pressure currently building behind some form of popular participation in major
constitutional reform in Canada is a response to the failure to properly give voice to the people in
the process of patriation in 1982. In Part V, I close by suggesting, perhaps counterintuitively, that
layering a requirement of national referendal consultation onto the existing requirements for
formal amendments to the Constitution’s basic structure could undermine democracy, despite our
common association of referenda with democratic legitimacy. I suggest instead that a national
referendum should be an alternative path, not an additional step, in constitutional amendment. I
also reflect on the susceptibility of the Constitution of Canada to informal constitutional change.
II.

THE CHARLOTTETOWN ACCORD REFERENDUM

The Constitution Act, 1982 left unresolved many questions needing answers before
constitutional peace could ever be possible in Canada, including whether and how to recognize the
special status of Quebec, how to reform national institutions to assuage provincial alienation, and
how to justly operationalize the right of self-government for First Nations.28 The Meech Lake
Accord, negotiated in 1987 only a few years after the patriation of the Constitution, sought to
23

Ibid.
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
See infra text accompanying notes 81-88.
27
In a related Article, I explain more fully the concept of “the basic structure” of a constitution with reference to the
basic structure doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court of India. See Richard Albert, “The Theory and Doctrine of
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment in Canada” (forthcoming 2016) 41 Queen’s L.J.
28
See Ronald L. Watts, “Three Decades of Periodic Federal Crises” (1996) 17 Int’l Pol. Sci. Rev. 353 at 357.
24
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answer some of these questions.29 But its principal purpose, to be sure, was reconciliating Quebec
with the rest of Canada in the aftermath of the adoption the Constitution Act, 1982 over objections
from its provincial government.30 The Accord was designed to address Quebec’s five conditions
for finally accepting the Constitution Act, 1982: recognition of its distinctiveness, a larger role in
immigration, a role in Supreme Court appointments, limits on the federal spending power, and a
veto on constitutional amendments.31 In retrospect, one might fairly suggest that the Accord sought
to end the “moral exclusion” of Quebec in constitutional politics.32
A. Meech Lake and its Consequences
The Meech Lake Accord proposed to amend both the Constitution Act, 1867 and the
Constitution Act, 1982. As to the former, it would have inserted a declaration that “Quebec
constitutes within Canada a distinct society,”33 it would have changed the method of senatorial
selection to require Senate vacancies to be filled from a list of nominees proposed by provincial
governments,34 and it would have granted provinces some power over immigration.35 Among other
items, the Accord would also have constitutionalized the Supreme Court and required the prime
minister to convene an annual conference of first ministers.36 As to the Constitution Act, 1982, the
Accord proposed to amend the rules of formal amendment, notably by granting a veto to all
provinces in connection with amendments to matters of provincial interest such as proportional
representation in the House of Commons, the Supreme Court, as well as senatorial powers,
selection and representation.37 The Accord also mandated additional constitutional conferences.38
The Meech Lake Accord ultimately collapsed in 1990 when political actors failed to ratify
it by the three-year deadline arguably required for ratification.39 Under Canada’s formal
amendment rules, some amendment proposals expire if they are not ratified within three years.40
This temporal restriction applies to a specified class of amendments concerning proportional
representation in the House of Commons, certain features of the Supreme Court, provincial

29

See Richard Simeon, “Meech Lake and Shifting Conceptions of Canadian Federalism” (1988) 14 Can. Pub. Pol’y
Supp. S7 at S13-S21.
30
See Samuel V. Laselva, The Moral Foundations of Canadian Federalism (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996)
at 192.
31
See Peter W. Hogg, Meech Lake Constitutional Accord Annotated (Carswell, 1988) at 3-4.
32
Pierre Fournier, A Meech Lake Post-Mortem: Is Quebec Sovereignty Inevitable? (McGill-Queen’s University Press,
1991) at 15.
33
Meech Lake Accord, at Schedule s. 1.
34
Ibid. at Schedule s. 2.
35
Ibid. at Schedule s. 3.
36
Ibid. at Schedule ss. 6, 8.
37
Ibid. at Schedule s. 9.
38
Ibid. at Schedule s. 13.
39
See Christopher P. Manfredi, “Institutional Design and the Politics of Constitutional Modification: Understanding
Amendment Failure in the United States and Canada” (1997) 31 L. & Soc. Rev. 111 at 123. I qualify it as “arguably”
required by the Constitution because it is not clear that the three-year deadline applied to the entire package of
amendments. See F.L. Morton, “How Not to Amend the Constitution” (1989) 12 Can. Parl. Rev. 9 at 9-10. As I explain
elsewhere, parts of the Accord triggered the three-year deadline and others did not, but political actors nevertheless
chose to subject the entire accord to the three-year deadline since the Accord had been proposed as an omnibus bill of
amendments. See Richard Albert, “Temporal Limitations in Constitutional Amendment” (draft on file with author).
40
See Constitution Act, 1982, pt. V. s. 39(2).
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creation and expansion, as well as senatorial powers, selection and representation.41 The Accord
had proposed to amend some of these matters, as well as other important subjects not subject to
any temporal restrictions. The point is that political actors eventually ran out of time, though one
might plausibly wonder whether ratification would have been possible with more time.42
The 1992 Charlottetown Accord was an effort to make up for both the substantive and
procedural shortcomings that had felled the Meech Lake Accord.43 This new Accord proposed a
large-scale overhaul of the Constitution of Canada, even more transformative than the Meech Lake
Accord would have been. The Charlottetown Accord proposed once again to recognize that
Quebec is a “distinct society”44 but it also proposed to entrench a “Canada Clause” that would
have expressed Canadian values so as to guide judges in their interpretation of the Constitution.45
In addition, the Accord would have more robustly recognized Aboriginal rights,46 defined and in
some cases redefined the terms of the federal distribution of powers,47 reformed the Senate and the
House of Common as well as the Supreme Court,48 and it would have amended the rules of formal
amendment themselves.49 The Accord also sought to reinforce linguistic rights50 and, as with the
Meech Lake Accord, it also entrenched the annual requirement of a first ministers’ conference.51
B. The Charlottetown Innovation
Canadian political actors took an unusual path to ratify the Charlottetown Accord. They
submitted the entire Accord to the Canadian electorate in a national referendum. This form of
referendal consultation was a constitutional innovation because the formal amendment rules
entrenched in the Constitution of Canada did not then, nor do they now, require a national
referendum to ratify an amendment.52 The Referendum Act, passed roughly four months before the
referendum, had authorized the Governor General “to obtain by means of a referendum the opinion
of electors on any question relating to the Constitution of Canada.”53 By its terms, the referendum
was not legally binding and did not constitute a mandatory part of the amendment process. As a
legal matter, then, the referendum was purely consultative. It was intended only as a discretionary
supplementary step in the formal process to adopt the amendment package, which required
41

Ibid. at s. 42(1).
Elijah Harper, a member of the Manitoba provincial legislature, was a holdout in granting unanimous consent to
introduce the ratifying motion onto the floor. See Ian Peach, “The Power of a Single Feather: Meech Lake, Indigenous
Resistance and the Evolution of Indigenous Politics in Canada” (20100) 16 Rev. Const. Stud. 1 at 10.
43
See, e.g., David R. Cameron & Jacqueline D. Krikorian, “Recognizing Quebec in the Constitution of Canada: Using
the Bilateral Constitutional Amendment Process” (2008) 58 U. Toronto L.J. 389 at 393; Harold D. Clarke & Allan
Kornberg, “The Politics and Economics of Constitutional Choice: Voting in Canada’s 1992 National Referendum”
(1994) 56 J. Pol. 940 at 942-44; Jeffrey J. Cole, “Canadian Discord Over the Charlottetown Accord: The Constitutional
War to Win Quebec” (1993) 11 Dick. J. Int’l L. 627 at 642-44.
44
Charlottetown Accord, at I.A.1.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid. at I.A.2, IV
47
Ibid. at I.B., III.
48
Ibid. at II.A-C.
49
Ibid. at IV.
50
Ibid. at I.A.3.
51
Ibid. at II.D.
52
Constitution Act, 1982, Part V, ss. 38-49.
53
Referendum Act, s. 3(1), S.C. 1992, c. 30.
42
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approval resolutions from the Parliament of Canada and each of the provincial assemblies pursuant
to the unanimity procedure in section 41 of the Constitution Act, 1982.54
The referendum question asked voters to answer whether they agreed that “the Constitution
of Canada should be renewed on the basis of the [Charlottetown Accord]”.55 The Proclamation
directing the referendum made clear that the referendum question had been approved by the House
of Commons and the Senate, that it was “in the public interest” to “direct that the opinion of
electors be obtained” on the question, and that provincial and territorial electors were called to
participate.56 Although the result of the referendum had been intended by law to be only advisory
and not binding on political actors,57 the political salience of a majority vote in favour of the
Accord would have legitimated the amendment package and generated momentum to push it
through ultimate ratification by the provincial assemblies.58 It would have been unimaginable for
provincial political actors to oppose the considered judgment of their constituents.59 Indeed, the
group of First Ministers had agreed not to seek formal ratification of the Accord unless it had first
won majority approval in each province in the consultative referendum.60
Canadians ultimately rejected the Accord by a margin of 54.3 percent to 45.7 percent, with
voters in only four of Canada’s ten provinces and (at the time) two territories approving the
amendment package.61 Political actors thereafter chose not to proceed with the textually-prescribed
procedures for formally ratifying the Accord in light of these results.
Scholars have attributed the failure of the Charlottetown Accord to many factors, from
specific ones concerning the details of the package such as displeasure with the Canada Clause,
confusion about how aboriginal self-government would work alongside federalism in Canada and
unease with the constitutional veto power,62 to more general theories for its failure, including
54

Peter W. Hogg, “The Difficulty of Amending the Constitution of Canada” (1993) 31 Osgoode Hall L.J. 41 at 4243.
55
Proclamation Directing a Referendum Relating to the Constitution of Canada, SI/92-180, Registered on 1992-1007, available online: http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SI-92-180/page-1.html (last visited December 1, 2015).
56
Ibid. Quebec administered its own separate referendum on the matter. See Lawrence LeDuc, “Canada’s
Constitutional Referendum of 1992: A Great Big No” (1993) 12 Electoral Stud. 257 at 259.
57
By provincial law, the referendum results in Alberta and British Columbia were binding upon their respective
legislatures. See Constitutional Referendum Act, Rev. Stat. Alb. 2000, C-25, s.12(c) (Alberta); Constitutional
Amendment Approval Act, Rev. Stat. B.C. 1996, C-67, s. 1 (B.C.); Referendum Act, Rev. Stat. B.C. 1996, C-400, s.
4 (B.C.).
58
See Peter H. Russell, “The End of Mega Constitutional Politics in Canada?” (1993) 26 Pol. Sci. & Pol. 33 at 33.
59
Indeed, then-Prime Minister Brian Mulroney said it would be “morally unacceptable” for political actors to proceed
with the amendment package if voters had rejected it in even one province. See Jeffrey Ulbrich, “Campaign Winds
Up
for
Monday’s
Referendum’
Associated
Press
(25
October
1992),
available
online:
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1992/Campaign-Winds-Up-For-Monday-s-Referendum/id75ee5f5fbc23c3e3685808917462accb (last visited December 1, 2015).
60
Ian Greene, “Constitutional Amendment in Canada and the United States’ in Stephen L. Newman (ed.),
Constitutional Politics in Canada and the United States (State University of New York Press 2004) at 257.
61
See The 1992 Federal Referendum—A Challenge Met: Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, at 58,
January 17, 1994, available online: http://www.elections.ca/res/rep/off/1992/1992_Referendum_Part_2_E.pdf (last
visited December 1, 2015).
62
The Honourable Joseph A. Ghiz, The Dick, Ruth and Judy Bell Lecture: “An Insider’s Perspective of Meech Lake
& Charlottetown’, Carleton University, Ottawa, October 20, 1993, available online: http://carleton.ca/fpa/wpcontent/uploads/joe-ghiz-1993.pdf (last visited December 1, 2015). John Whyte also suggests that “popular sentiment
recognized the element of political in minority community rights which, although essential to stabilizing the nation,
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amendment overload63 and the challenge that large-scale constitutional bargaining presents for
successful amendment.64 The best summation of the Accord’s collapse, however, is this:
The package Canadians rejected was formidably complex. It became so by a
decade’s accretion of elements, each calculated to appeal to, or to offset
concessions to, groups excluded at an earlier stage—Quebec, the western
provinces, and aboriginal peoples. Negotiators hoped that by 1992 they had finally
found an equilibrium, a logroll sufficiently inclusive to survive referral to the
people. Instead they seem to have gotten the logic of the logroll upside down: they
may have overestimated both how much each group wanted what it got and how
intensely some groups opposed key concessions to others.65
C. The Impetus for Referendal Consultation
The fatal flaw of the Meech Lake Accord was the process by which it had been drafted.
Federal and provincial elites negotiated the accord in closed meetings that would later call into
question elite-driven executive federalism as a democratically legitimate process for constitutional
change in Canada.66 The lead constitutional advisor to the Government of Canada at the time,
Mary Dawson, has acknowledged the charges “that the deal had been cooked up behind closed
doors by a group of men in suits.”67 As Dawson observes, “the Charter had given Canadians a
sense of empowerment, and they were resisting what they characterized as secret deals.”68 As a
consequence, the political actors who negotiated the details of the Charlottetown Accord rejected
the secrecy of the Meech Lake Accord and instead embraced transparency.
It is important to ask how. Throughout the Charlottetown process, federal actors facilitated
opportunities for public dialogue with citizens and interest groups, and they also undertook
consultations with First Nations and territorial governments—and provincial actors followed
suit.69 The federal government created a Cabinet Committee on Canadian Unity and Constitutional
Affairs that held roving meetings to consult directly with Canadians across the country.70 The
federal government also issued publications throughout the process to keep Canadians abreast of
the questions and proposals along the way.71 The process, at least on the federal government’s end,
can also be nation-fracturing.” John Whyte, “Rejection of Charlottetown Accord Ended Era of Constitutional Reform’,
Toronto
Star,
October
26,
2012,
available
online:
http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorialopinion/2012/10/26/rejection_of_charlottetown_accord_ended_era_of_con
stitutional_reform.html (last visited December 1, 2015).
63
See Christopher P. Manfredi & Michael Lusztig, “Why do Formal Amendments Fail? An Institutional Analysis”
(1998) 50 World Politics 377 at 380.
64
See Michael Lusztig, “Constitutional Paralysis: Why Canadian Constitutional Initiatives are Doomed to Fail” (1994)
27 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 747 at 748.
65
Richard Johnston, “An Inverted Logroll: The Charlottetown Accord and the Referendum” (1993) 26 Pol. Sci. &
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culminated with a series of televised conferences on different parts of the constitutional reform
package, all intended to inform Canadians.72 And when federal political actors met with their
provincial, territorial and aboriginal counterparts to actually draft the Accord, they conducted their
proceedings in private but then held public press briefings at the close of each day.73 All of this
raised a sharp contrast to the closed proceedings that had produced the Meech Lake Accord.
Other factors prompted the federal government to initiate a national referendum. For one,
Quebec had committed to holding a referendum on its future in Canada by October 1992; Canada’s
national referendum on the Charlottetown Accord would satisfy that commitment in Quebec.74
Second, some provinces had passed their own laws requiring consultative provincial referenda
prior to their legislatures ratifying a constitutional amendment.75 These provincial referenda
highlight a third factor: the federal government had calculated that holding its own nation-wide
referendum would allow it to exercise greater control over the administration of the referendum
rather than leaving a matter of such high stakes to the vagaries of separate provincial political
processes.76 Fourth, a successful national referendum approving the Accord would have prevented
the agreement from unraveling slowly between its drafting and provincial ratification, which is
precisely what had happened to the Meech Lake Accord.77
Each of these reasons suggests that holding a referendum was a politically expedient
choice. One might well wonder whether the federal government’s decision to insert a consultative
referendum into the process of constitutional amendment was driven instrumentally by political
facts or by the government’s perception of or belief in the intrinsic value of popular participation.78
Indeed, Matthew Mendelsohn and Fred Cutler have observed that “Canadian political leaders had
been coerced into holding a referendum and many observers felt that the political class was looking
to orchestrate a response and seek legitimation, rather than engage in genuine consultation”.79
Federal political actors had not been constitutionally obligated to submit the Charlottetown
amendment package to a national referendum. After all, there is no mention of referendal
consultation or ratification in the Constitution’s formal amendment rules.80 The Constitution Act,
1982 creates five formal amendment thresholds, each requiring an escalating measure of federal
or provincial legislative action, sometimes in tandem, with the applicable threshold rising in
difficulty according to the functional or symbolic importance of the entrenched provision to be
72
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amended.81 For example, the Constitution requires a lower quantum of political agreement to
amend a narrow matter of concern only to the House of Commons than it does to amend a matter
that concerns Canada’s federal institutions, including the monarchy, the Supreme Court and the
Senate.82 This reflects a hierarchy of constitutional importance: the quantum of political agreement
rises according to the importance assigned to the matter to be amended.83
These five formal amendment thresholds thus increase in difficulty. Under the unilateral
provincial amendment power, a provincial assembly may amend its own provincial constitution
by a simple law.84 The unilateral federal amendment power confers an analogous power upon
Parliament in respect of purely federal matters.85 Under the regional amendment power, both
houses of Parliament and the assembly of the affected province(s) must agree to an amendment
that will affect some but not all provinces.86 The general multilateral amendment power requires
both houses of Parliament and two-thirds of provincial assemblies representing half of the total
provincial population to agree to an amendment on various matters of national scope.87 And the
unanimous amendment power requires the agreement of both houses of Parliament and each of the
provincial assemblies to amend Canada’s most important institutions, principles and constitutional
provisions.88 None of these five rules requires or even mentions a referendum.
Nor did the Referendum Act make it compulsory for federal political actors to hold a
consultative referendum on the Charlottetown Accord.89 Political actors made a strategic choice to
hold a referendum. History at the time was similarly conclusive that the use of a referendum was
neither a necessary nor prudent step, as there had been no established practice of national
referenda.90 Yet the referendum became virtually politically imperative as a tool of legitimation
after the failure of the elite-led and closed-door negotiations for the Meech Lake Accord.
III.

PRECEDENT AND CONVENTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

The Charlottetown referendum was therefore believed to be a necessary innovation to
supplement the codified rules of formal amendment. Of course, it is not unusual for political
practice to depart from the constitutional text, particularly in Canada where the written constitution
does not always reflect the living constitution.91 Indeed it is accepted in Canada that a disjunction
can emerge between the written and unwritten Constitution, the former entrenching a provision
81
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that the latter no longer recognizes as valid.92 This is only one way that written constitutions
commonly change informally over time as political actors alter their behavior and in turn also the
social facts underlying the constitution. Accordingly it does not pose a problem for constitutional
theory to recognize that the written constitution must be interpreted in light of unwritten
principles.93 Yet the susceptibility of the Constitution of Canada to informal changes like these
raises a question worth asking: has the Charlottetown innovation matured into a constitutional
convention that today binds federal political actors even though holding a referendum appears to
defy the formal amendment rules entrenched in the text of the Constitution of Canada?
A. The Charlottetown Innovation: Precedent or Convention?
Commentators have suggested that the Charlottetown innovation has created an
expectation of direct popular participation requiring national referendal consultation for future
major constitutional reforms.94 One observer states the point directly in terms of precedent: “the
[Charlottetown] referendum created a precedent: Canadians must be consulted directly before
political leaders attempt to alter the country’s basic document.”95 The Charlottetown referendum,
it is said, “marks the end of the era of elite accommodation in matters constitutional and the
beginning of a new era of public consultation and ratification.”96 Therefore any process that fails
to consult the public through a referendum “is likely to be perceived as illegitimate.”97
On this majority view, the lesson of the failed Charlottetown Accord is that Canadians now
perceive the Charlottetown innovation as a “binding precedent” and that it is no longer possible
for political actors to approve major constitutional reforms through provincial legislatures alone.98
The referendum is “a fact of constitutional reform in Canada now,” the majority view continues,
and although minor constitutional amendments would not require a referendum, major
92
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constitutional reforms “will most likely require public ratification.”99 Commentators therefore
regard the Charlottetown referendum as a precedent that future political actors must follow.
The minority view, in contrast, suggests that the Charlottetown referendum is not binding.
For example, Benoît Pelletier speaks of “the 1992 precedent of the Charlottetown agreement, that
suggests that a Canada-wide referendum be held for constitutional reform, a precedent which, for
the time being, cannot, strictly speaking, be considered a constitutional convention.”100 And, in a
short paragraph, Peter Meekison seems also to reject the majority view. Meekison argues that the
Charlottetown experience was less about the centrality of referendal consultation itself than about
the importance of facilitating some measure of popular involvement in future constitutional
negotiations, though not necessarily in the form of a referendum.101
Neither the majority nor minority view appears to have been developed in any extensive
detail, but the minority view has been even less well developed. More importantly, as I will
explain, neither view is correct because we do not yet know whether the Charlottetown referendum
has matured into a convention. We can, however, explore the question and project the
circumstances that would tell us when and how to recognize now that a convention had taken root.
The first step in determining whether the Charlottetown referendum is binding on federal political
actors requires us to distinguish between precedent and convention—because the difference
between the two concepts holds the answer to whether political actors must once again hold a
national consultative referendum in the next round of constitutional reform.
Whether the Charlottetown referendum has created either a precedent or a convention is
difficult to know without a standard against which to judge how a practice matures into a
convention. Fortunately we can turn to an important illustration from Canadian constitutional
history to understand how a practice becomes a convention. Prior to the Constitution Act, 1982,
there was a convention on provincial consent to major constitutional reforms. The practice of
provincial consultation eventually matured into a convention of provincial consent, and although
the convention later became entrenched in the constitutional text, we may draw from this example
in comparative perspective to explore whether the Charlottetown innovation has created a federal
convention requiring national referendal consultation in major constitutional reforms in Canada.
B. Formal Amendment at Confederation
Canada’s founding constitution did not entrench a formal federal amendment rule.102 The
formal amendment power belonged to the Parliament of the United Kingdom, which retained the
exclusive authority to amend the Constitution Act, 1867, a colonial law that reflected its colonial
qualities.103 The only exception concerned provincial constitutions: the Constitution Act, 1867
conferred upon provinces the unilateral power to amend their provincial constitution.104 Over time,
99
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Canadian political actors came to expect the United Kingdom to pass an amendment only if it
could claim broad support across Canada.105 As a matter of law, any formal amendment would
begin and end in the United Kingdom, but as a matter of political reality, the process began in
Canada with a joint resolution of the House of Commons and the Senate requesting an
amendment.106 Before long, the United Kingdom would routinely agree to formally amend the
Constitution of Canada in the manner requested by the joint resolution issued from Canada.107
The problem arose in 1949 when the United Kingdom amended the Constitution, at
Canada’s request, to confer upon the Canadian Parliament a similar unilateral amendment
authority over purely federal subjects—a power the provinces already possessed over provincial
subjects in their own provincial constitution.108 The provinces worried that this new amendment
would embolden the Canadian Parliament to exploit its unilateral amendment power over federal
subjects to amend federal institutions of provincial concern without provincial consent.109 This
was a very reasonable concern. The textual silence left it unclear whether the federal government
was obligated even to consult with let alone obtain the consent of the provinces—and if yes, of
how many provinces—before requesting from the Parliament of the United Kingdom a major
constitutional amendment affecting the basic federal structure of the Constitution of Canada.110
The constitutional text did not entrench any formal amendment rule that answered this question.
Political practice, however, evolved over time to suggest that the Canadian Parliament
would not seek an amendment affecting federal-provincial relations without the federal
government first consulting with and obtaining the approval of the provinces. Of the sixteen
instances of formal amendment between Confederation and 1964, ten amendments had concerned
matters that were exclusively federal in nature according to the federal government, and therefore
did not require provincial consultation.111 As to the six amendments affecting federal-provincial
relations, the federal government consulted with the affected provinces in each instance and in all
but one case secured unanimous provincial consent.112 This federal practice of seeking provincial
approval for an amendment affecting federal-provincial relations appeared over time to evolve into
something more than a practice. Indeed, in each of the unsuccessful intergovernmental
negotiations from 1964 to 1980 on a new or revised constitution for Canada, the proposed rule for
formally amending matters affecting federal-provincial relations reflected this practice of securing
the consent of both federal and provincial governments to any major constitutional change.113
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C. The Convention of Provincial Consent
These historical precedents raised the all-important question: is securing provincial consent
to amendments affecting federal-provincial relations a practice or a convention? The Supreme
Court of Canada answered this question in the Patriation Reference in 1981 in connection with a
constitutional challenge to the federal government’s intention to proceed unilaterally, without
provincial consent, with only a joint resolution of both houses of the Parliament of Canada
requesting from the United Kingdom a package of major constitutional reforms altering the basic
federal structure of the Constitution of Canada.114 The specific question before the Court was
whether there exists a convention that the House of Commons and the Senate will not proceed
unilaterally to affect major constitutional reform without first securing provincial agreement.115
The Court answered that there is indeed a convention of substantial provincial consent.116
Looking to history, the Court noted that federal and provincial governments had for decades tried
to reach agreement on formal amendment rules for the Constitution of Canada, and although they
had failed each time, the quantification of provincial consent had invariably remained a central
question in their deliberations.117 This, for the Court, indicated “a clear recognition by all the
governments concerned of the principle that a substantial degree of provincial consent is
required.”118 But the Court left open the precise quantum of provincial consent required to respect
the conventional requirement of provincial agreement. The Court declared only that “a substantial
measure of provincial consent is required,” something more than the agreement of two provinces
and something less than unanimous agreement.119 Anticipating the objection that a convention on
provincial consent must reflect some specificity in order for political actors to operationalize it,
the Court explained that major constitutional reform must be governed by flexible conventions
until political actors manage to finally agree on the details of the formal amendment rules:
Nor can it be said that this lack of precision is such as to prevent the principle from
acquiring the constitutional status of a conventional rule. If a consensus had
emerged on the measure of provincial agreement, an amending formula would
quickly have been enacted and we would no longer be in the realm of conventions.
To demand as much precision as if this were the case and as if the rule were a legal
one is tantamount to denying that this area of the Canadian constitution is capable
of being governed by conventional rules.120
The Court’s answer prompted the federal government to reconsider its unilateralism and
instead to convene multilateral discussions to negotiate the package of amendments that would
later become the Constitution Act, 1982. Canada’s new constitutional text would entrench complex
formal amendment rules that retained both the federal and provincial unilateral powers of formal
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amendment over matters under their respective exclusive jurisdiction.121 Canada’s new formal
amendment rules would also entrench the convention of provincial consent for major constitutional
reform within a larger structure of escalating thresholds requiring a different quantum of provincial
agreement depending on the importance of the matter of federal-provincial concern to be
amended.122 Amendments affecting one or more but not all provinces would require the consent
of both houses of Parliament and of the affected provinces.123 One class of amendments affecting
all provinces would require the consent of both houses of Parliament as well as of seven provinces
representing at least half of the total provincial population.124 And another class of amendments
affecting all provinces would require the consent of both houses of Parliament and of all
provinces.125 These rules remain in force today, though not without some controversy.126
IV.

REFERENDAL CONSULTATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

The Court’s analysis in the Patriation Reference—specifically relating to how the federal
government’s practice of consulting with provinces eventually matured into a convention—is
instructive for evaluating whether there now exists a convention that binds federal political actors
to hold a national referendal consultation for major constitutional reforms in Canada. I stress here
the parameters of the inquiry into the existence or not of the convention under question: the
question is whether there now exists a convention that governs the conduct of federal political
actors, not provincial or territorial political actors, to hold a referendum to consult Canadians
across the country on a proposed amendment or package of amendments to the basic structure of
the Constitution. If such a convention exists, it would have consequences for the conduct of
provincial and territorial political actors. Their conduct would be driven by the conduct of federal
political actors, whose own conduct would be governed by this convention, if indeed it exists.
The Court is a critical actor for identifying the existence of a constitutional convention. As
H.L.A. Hart explained, the most relevant community for recognizing the binding quality of a rule
is the legal elite.127 Of course, the legal elite take action both in support of and in response to
popular will, but it falls to political actors in the legal elite to choose what to recognize as valid
and what conduct to credit. Hart understood a convention as a “shared acceptance,”128 a guiding
norm that need not be stated abut that must be perceived by political actors as non-discretionary.129

121
See Constitution Act, 1982, s. 44 (authorizing the Parliament of Canada to amend matters relating to purely federal
subjects), s. 45 (authorizing provincial legislatures to amend matters relating to their own provincial constitution).
122
See Albert, supra note 81, at 250.
123
Constitution Act, 1982, s. 43.
124
Ibid. at s. 38.
125
Ibid. at s. 41.
126
Despite this intricate escalating structure of formal amendment, there remain unresolved questions about which
particular amendment rule governs specific kinds of amendment. See Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] 1 S.C.R.
704 (“Senate Reform Reference”). Moreover, Quebec was not a signatory to the new constitution, and has yet to ratify
it. See Michael Seymour, “Quebec and Canada at the Crossroads: A Nation Within a Nation” (2000) 6 Nations &
Nationalism 227 at 248.
127
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2d ed. 1994) at 256.
128
Ibid. at 102.
129
Ibid. at 101.

—FORTHCOMING—

[15]

—IN REVISION—

RICHARD ALBERT

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT CONVENTIONS

A convention therefore exercises a regulatory function on political actors: it regulates their conduct
and expectations by creating a body of common understandings, habits and practices.130
A. Conventions in Canadian Courts
Courts will not enforce conventions but they will recognize them, as the Court did in the
Patriation Reference.131 The Court gave four reasons why it will not enforce them: first,
conventions are not statutory rules that courts ordinarily interpret and apply; second, conventions
are rooted in precedents established by political actors and not in judicial precedents like common
law rules; third, the legal system does not contemplate any formal sanction for breaching
conventions because sanctions, if any are to follow, would be political, not legal; and fourth,
conventions are by nature often in conflict with legal rules that courts are bound to enforce.132 This
tension between convention and law “prevents the courts from enforcing conventions [and] also
prevents conventions from crystallizing into laws, unless it be by statutory adoption.”133
Courts will nonetheless recognize conventions. Insofar as the main purpose of a convention
is “to ensure that the legal framework of the constitution will be operated in accordance with the
prevailing constitutional values or principles of the period,”134 a convention forms an integral if
unwritten part of a regime’s constitution and may sometimes be even more important than its
laws.135 The Court observed in the Reference that this is uncontroversially true in Canada insofar
as the preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867 highlights the centrality of conventions to the
constitutional system.136 The Court was right to note that conventions operate against the backdrop
of the prevailing constitutional values of the period because conventions are not fixed points. They
are neither eternal nor unconditional: they may be overridden by sustained contrary practice or,
short of reversal, they may evolve both predictably and unpredictably as political actors alter their
practices.137 Yet despite their unwrittenness and their non-enforceability in courts, conventions
reflect a certain empirical simplicity because they “ultimately reflect what people do.”138
Identifying a convention requires more than counting occurrences of a practice, however.
In the Reference, the Court relied on Ivor Jennings’ three-part test to evaluate whether the federal
government was bound by a convention of securing substantial provincial consent for fundamental
constitutional change where federal-provincial interests are engaged.139 To establish that a
convention exists, Jennings explained that “we have to ask ourselves three questions: first, what
130
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are the precedents, secondly, did the actors in the precedents believe that they were bound by a
rule; and thirdly, is there a reason for the rule?”140 The Court determined that political actors had
established a precedent of securing provincial consent, and thereafter had continued for decades
to follow the precedent because they had grown to feel bound by it.141 But the Court noted that
political actors followed the rule for a reason, not out of convenience or habit: securing provincial
consent was consistent with and indeed necessitated by Canada’s federal character.142 The Court
also observed that for any constitutional change affecting federal-provincial relations, “the federal
principle cannot be reconciled with a state of affairs where the modification of provincial
legislative powers could be obtained by the unilateral action of the federal authorities.”143
B. The Law and Politics of Referenda in Constitutional Amendment
The three-part Jennings test provides a framework to evaluate whether there is a convention
that binds federal actors to hold a national referendum on future reforms to the basic structure of
the Constitution of Canada. The answer to the first question—whether there are precedents—risks
being obscured by insufficient specificity as to the precise practice for which we must identify
precedents. Whether there are any precedents in Canada on holding referenda is not the right
question to ask nor is the right question whether there are precedents of the federal government
holding referenda. Examining the history of referenda in Canada yields the perception that
referenda are common occurrences.144 The federal government has administered three referenda
over the years,145 and provinces and territories have held dozens of referenda of their own on
subjects as varied as women’s suffrage, public health insurance, balanced budget legislation,
daylight savings time and electoral recall.146 Yet this long record of referenda in Canada is not
relevant to the essential focus of the first question into whether a convention exists. That question
can be answered only by asking whether there are precedents on holding national referenda on
constitutional amendment. On this point, Canadian history is clear: the Charlottetown innovation
is the only instance of national referendal consultation relating to a constitutional amendment.147
That there is only one prior instance of national referendal consultation would seem to
foreclose the possibility of a convention. Jennings, after all, insisted that political actors are not
140
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bound to act in a certain way simply because they may have once in the past behaved in a particular
way.148 The search for precedent to support the existence of a convention generally requires more
than one instance of a particular conduct, although Jennings did concede that “a single precedent
with a good reason may be enough to establish the rule.”149 This is not to suggest that a string of
precedents on its own is enough to create a convention that will govern the conduct of political
actors. For Jennings, one occurrence is not enough but neither is a series of identical occurrences.
Mere practice, as Jennings writes, is insufficient on its own to establish a convention: “the fact that
an authority has always behaved in a certain way is no warrant for saying that it ought to behave
in that way.”150 Creating a convention turns on something more than the frequency of occurrences.
Yet the Charlottetown innovation is not the only relevant precedent. As Andrew Heard
observes, the first part of the Jennings test leaves unanswered whether one should consider both
positive and negative precedents.151 This is an important question, according to Heard, because
“sometimes, what did not happen and why can be just as revealing, or even more so, than what has
happened.”152 We should therefore also look for negative precedents on the use of referenda in
constitutional amendment, specifically for occasions where political actors have rejected the use
of referenda in constitutional amendment. There is indeed one such important negative precedent.
The negative precedent dates to 1980, when the federal government prepared a joint
resolution for both houses of Parliament to unilaterally patriate the Constitution of Canada.153 The
joint resolution proposed a package of amendments on a multiplicity of matters but none was more
controversial than the proposed formal amendment rules. The joint resolution created two general
amendment procedures. The first authorized an amendment with resolutions from both houses of
Parliament as well as well a majority of provincial legislatures meeting specific quorum
requirements by population and geography.154 The second general amendment procedure
authorized an amendment by a referendum proposed by both houses of Parliament and ratified by
a majority of participating voters, including a majority of voters in a specific geographical
distribution of provinces across western, central and eastern Canada.155 The joint resolution
therefore proposed to give the Parliament of Canada the option of pursuing a general amendment
to the Constitution of Canada either via provincial legislative ratification or referendal ratification.
Despite the federal government’s initial insistence that it would stand firm behind
preserving the referendum option,156 the proposal to entrench an option of referendal ratification
in the formal amendment process did not survive the patriation negotiations,157 and ultimately led
148
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to the Patriation Reference.158 The proposal for referendal ratification in constitutional amendment
was unusual given that it had never before been discussed at a federal-provincial conference nor
more generally in the country.159 It was a “radically new”160 device in constitutional amendment.
The Official Opposition denounced the referendum option as contrary to Canada’s structure of
government, which it viewed as anchored in the separation of powers between federal and
provincial government. The Opposition argued that the federal government was now “trying to
change that division by having constitutional amendments approved by referendum, rather than
provincial legislatures.”161 Opponents worried that the referendum option could lead to “the
tyranny of the 51 percent majority”162 and were therefore reluctant to support it because it “rais[ed]
a constant threat that the federal Government will go it alone on future amendments.”163
The provinces rejected the referendum proposal.164 The referendal path would have given
the federal government the option of seeking to ratify an amendment by national referendum even
where the provincial governments had withheld their consent to the amendment.165 No other
proposal drew greater resistance from provinces.166 Provinces worried that the federal government
would use referenda to marginalize them.167 In an editorial, a leading national newspaper observed
that the referendum option would allow the federal government to “ride roughshod over the
Legislatures.”168 The referendum proposal was seen as an anti-provincial federal “weapon ... for
use in overcoming provincial opposition to substantive constitutional amendments.”169 There was
one further reason to oppose the referendum option: referenda, opponents argued at the time, could
exacerbate the existing regional divisions in Canada by highlighting them in the results of the
referendum. Saskatchewan Premier Allan Blakeney thus argued that “the whole idea of a
referendum as a way to weld this country more closely together when the regional pulls are strong
is ill-conceived.”170 There were many reasons to oppose the referendal option. This is an important
negative precedent that weighs against seeing the referendum as a conventional requirement.
The second inquiry in the three-part Jennings test informs the first: do political actors feel
themselves bound by the precedents? Just as the first inquiry must be framed at the lowest level of
abstraction in order to isolate the nub of the matter—whether there is a federal convention of
national referendal consultation in major constitutional reform—this second inquiry must similarly
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be framed with specificity so as not to elide over important distinctions. It is important to recall
that were a national consultation like the Charlottetown referendum to occur in the future, it would
be ordered, controlled and administered by the Parliament of Canada, the federal government and
federal institutions.171 Consequently it matters less whether provincial or territorial political actors
feel bound by the Charlottetown precedent than whether political actors at the federal level
specifically feel bound by it. The point is not that provincial referenda are irrelevant to major
constitutional reform. Indeed, as I suggest below, they may ultimately be directly relevant to the
formation of a convention on national referendal consultation. But we must focus on whether
federal actors feel themselves bound by the Charlottetown innovation because this inquiry is
concerned only on whether there is a federal convention of national referendal consultation.
Focusing on whether provincial or territorial political actors are bound by a convention of
referendal consultation would distort the inquiry because many provinces and territories have
enacted laws that require referendal consultation, with some requiring binding ratification before
approving an amendment to the Constitution of Canada. For instance, Alberta’s Constitutional
Referendum Act requires a provincial referendum “before a resolution authorizing an amendment
to the Constitution of Canada is voted on by the Legislative Assembly.”172 By provincial law, the
result of the provincial referendum is binding on the government that initiated the referendum.173
British Columbia’s Constitutional Amendment Approval Act and its Referendum Act
likewise require respectively that “the government must not introduce a motion for a resolution of
the Legislative Assembly authorizing an amendment to the Constitution of Canada unless a
referendum has first been conducted under the Referendum Act with respect to the subject matter
of that resolution”174 and also that the referendum result “is binding on the government that
initiated the referendum.”175 Other provinces and territories authorize but do not require their
governments to hold referenda. Of these referendal laws, certain ones make their results binding
on the provincial or territorial government176 whereas others make them simply advisory.177 Some
provincial and territorial political actors are therefore constrained by law.178 These various
provincial and territorial laws may eventually by accumulation force the creation of a national
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standard for referendal consultation, in which case federal actors would be responding to
provincial and territorial pressures. Provincial and territorial actors would remain bound by law.
There are no similar laws requiring federal political actors to consult Canadians in a
referendum before proposing a constitutional amendment to the basic structure of the Constitution
of Canada. The federal Referendum Act authorizes the federal government to hold a referendum in
connection with a constitutional amendment, but it does not make referendal consultation
compulsory. The law instead confers broad discretionary authority upon the federal government
to hold one should it be in the “public interest.”179 In light of the limited scope of the Referendum
Act, Canada’s formal amendment rules evidently reflect the entire codification of the binding rules
of amendment. Yet the question remains whether there are any unwritten rules to formal
amendment, namely, in our inquiry, a federal convention on national referendal consultation.180
Were federal political actors to feel bound by the Charlottetown precedent, this would suggest that
they had come to believe that adhering to the Constitution of Canada’s textually-entrenched
procedures for formal amendment was a necessary though insufficient condition for achieving
major constitutional reform. The rule of recognition would have compelled them to recognize the
legitimacy-conferring function of national referendal consultation as an unwritten though
obligatory prerequisite for formally amending the basic structure of the Constitution of Canada.
In light of Hart’s view that the most relevant community for recognizing the binding quality
of a rule is the legal elite, it is worth inquiring into the Court’s view. This is not a dispositive point
but it is important and useful to consider. Had the Charlottetown innovation matured into a
constitutional convention, it is possible though not necessary that the Court would have
acknowledged it when it issued its recent advisory opinion on constitutional reforms to the
Senate.181 The Court, as discussed above,182 had earlier recognized though not enforced the
convention on substantial provincial agreement for amendments affecting federal-provincial
relations.183 The Court’s advisory opinion on Senate reform was prompted by the Government’s
request for clarity on the amendment process required to change the method of Senator selection,
to establish fixed terms of senatorial tenure, and to abolish the Senate, among other proposals.184
Although the Court did invoke in the Senate Reform Refence its earlier validation in the
Patriation Reference of a convention requiring substantial provincial consent for amendments
affecting federal-provincial relations,185 the Court did not discuss referendal consultation in its
opinion on Senate reform. The Court did, however, explain that the Constitution Act, 1982
“provides the blueprint for how to amend the Constitution of Canada” and that “it tells us what
changes Parliament and the provincial legislatures can make unilaterally, what changes require
substantial federal and provincial consent, and what changes require unanimous agreement.”186
Where constitutional amendment touches upon Canada’s federal structure, the Constitution Act,
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1982 requires approval from the Parliament of Canada and a significant representation of
provinces.187 The Court examined each of the five procedures for formally amending the
Constitution of Canada under the Constitution Act, 1982’s escalating amendment framework, and
in no case did it suggest that those procedures were insufficient for a formal amendment.188
On the contrary, the Court interpreted these procedures as necessary and sufficient for their
respective class of formal amendments.189 The Court identified the scope of the political consent
required for each proposed constitutional amendment concerning the Senate. The Court confirmed
that changing the method of Senator selection would require conformity with Sections 38 and 42
of the Constitution Act, 1982, specifically the agreement of both houses of the Parliament of
Canada as well as seven of the provinces representing at least half of the total population.190 The
Court concluded that the same consent threshold in Section 38 applies to formally amending
Senate terms, for instance were the proposal is to impose fixed terms of service.191 With respect to
the amendment proposal to abolish the Senate, the Court observed that it “would fundamentally
alter our constitutional architecture—by removing the bicameral form of government that gives
shape to the Constitution Act, 1867,”192 suggesting that the amendment would profoundly change
the Constitution of Canada. Yet even this most fundamental of formal amendments to the
Constitution of Canada would not, for the Court, require referendal consultation; the Court
declared that Section 41’s unanimity procedure would govern Senate abolition, requiring the
agreement of both houses of Parliament and each of the provincial legislatures.193 The Court
therefore did not recognize the importance of referendal consultation.194 Again, I stress that this
point is not dispositive, though it does raise a useful contrast to the Patriation Reference
The Court did, however, discuss the role of referenda in the Secession Reference. The
Court acknowledged that referenda “appeal to some of the same principles that underlie the
legitimacy of the Constitution itself, namely, democracy and self-government.”195 The Court
moreover noted that referenda are an important tool for governance in constitutional democracy,
but made it clear that the Constitution neither provides for their use nor gives them legal force:
Although the Constitution does not itself address the use of a referendum procedure,
and the results of a referendum have no direct role or legal effect in our
constitutional scheme, a referendum undoubtedly may provide a democratic
method of ascertaining the views of the electorate on important political questions
on a particular occasion.196
The Court suggested that political actors could allow themselves to be guided by a referendum
result but emphasized that the final choice must be made through the institutions of representative
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government. Political actors, the Court wrote, “may, of course, take their cue from a referendum,
but in legal terms, constitution-making in Canada, as in many countries, is undertaken by the
democratically elected representatives of the people.”197 For the Court, therefore, the Constitution
is clear today in not requiring referendal ratification for constitutional amendments, major or not.
There remains the third part of the inquiry into whether a convention exists: is there a
reason for the rule?198 The answers to the first two parts of the inquiry may seem to obviate the
need to answer the third, but Jennings cautioned care in applying his formula where there exists
only one precedent: “a single precedent,” stressed Jennings, “with good reason may be enough to
establish the rule.”199 The reason for the Charlottetown innovation may therefore be sufficiently
compelling so as to transform its single occurrence into a conventional rule that binds federal actors
to hold a national referendum. Jennings offered little guidance on how to evaluate the sufficiency
of the reason supporting the convention, stating only that the creation of a convention “must be
normative”200 and “must be due to the reason of the thing because it accords with the prevailing
political philosophy.”201 Jennings added that the creation of a convention “helps to make the
democratic system operate; it enables the machinery of State to run more smoothly; and if it were
not there friction would result.”202 Jennings appears to be privileging three factors in evaluating
the sufficiency of the reason for the rule: normativity, consistency, and efficiency.
Normativity relates to the principle underlying the practice. There must be a principled
reason for following a political practice, which later matures into a convention. The leading scholar
of Canadian constitutional conventions, Andrew Heard, observes that absent a reason for adhering
to a political practice, “the obligation could simply be one of conformity to tradition, policy
preference,” or “mere habit.”203 These reasons for rule-following are insufficient to create a
convention inasmuch as they are not supported by a governing principle that gives the reasons
“any force as rules of constitutional morality.”204 Measuring the Charlottetown innovation against
this factor does not yield a clear answer as to whether the normative justification for the practice
is either satisfied or lacking. As discussed above,205 the Charlottetown precedent appears to have
arisen out of instrumental not intrinsic reasons. Political actors do not appear to have been
motivated by a commitment to the intrinsic value of popular participation in major constitutional
reform; they appear instead to have been motivated by political expediency.206
On its own, the matter of normativity cannot determine whether a convention exists. But it
is central to the inquiry, though in this case it is not clear whether the Charlottetown innovation
fulfills the normativity factor. On one view, the instrumental purpose of federal political actors
suggests the absence of the normativity required in order to recognize a rule as a convention. Yet
on another view, the instrumental motivation for holding the Charlottetown referendum could be
197
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understood to reflect a normative justification anchored in democratic legitimacy. Federal political
actors, on this account, thought it necessary to respond to the call for more participatory forms of
democracy in the aftermath of the failure of the Meech Lake Accord. Their solution, one of many
possible options, was to hold a referendum, which they did of their own volition, not under duress.
Consistency and efficiency, however, appear lacking in our evaluation of the justification
for the Charlottetown innovation. As discussed above,207 Canada has no history of national
referendal consultation in constitutional amendment, nor is there in the country an overwhelming
record of national referendal consultation more generally. Indeed, there is an important and recent
negative precedent suggesting that national referenda are a point of contention for provincial
premiers.208 It is therefore difficult to support the argument that the Charlottetown innovation
“accords with the prevailing political philosophy.209 With regard to efficiency—Jennings’ view
that the practice must help the democratic system operate more smoothly210—if federal political
actors were bound by a convention of national referendal consultation, this would only further
complicate the already onerous multilateral amendment process for major constitutional reform.211
For now, one cannot state that there is a federal convention of national referendal
consultation in major constitutional reform in Canada. The Charlottetown innovation is the only
instance of referendal consultation for a constitutional amendment, and it is one of only three
national referenda in Canadian history.212 That provinces have a longer record of consultative
referenda speaks to their own local history and practices, not to the question whether there exists
a convention that binds federal political actors to hold a referendum on major constitutional
reforms. The Court has not recognized the existence of such a convention, even when faced with
a question directly related to the rules for major constitutional reform.213 The Court instead
interpreted the formal amendment rules entrenched in the Constitution Act, 1982 as necessary and
sufficient conditions for effecting changes to the basic structure of the Constitution of Canada.214
Moreover, the Charlottetown innovation appears on one view to be lacking in consistency and
efficiency as well as in its normative foundation. The referendum appears to have been motivated
by instrumental reasons in response to the procedural deficiencies in connection with the Meech
Lake Accord, not by intrinsic justifications on the value of participatory democracy.215 There is,
207

See supra text accompanying notes 144-50.
See supra text accompanying notes 151-70.
209
Jennings, supra note 140, at 136.
210
Ibid.
211
Formal amendment in Canada is incredibly complex. See Katherine Swinton, “Amending the Canadian
Constitution: Lessons from Meech Lake” (1992) 42 U. Toronto L.J. 139 at 144. This is attributable partly to the
federalization of constitutional politics. See Bettina Petersohn, “Constitutional Reform and Federal Dynamics: Causes
and Effects’ in Arthur Benz & Jörg Broschek (eds), Federal Dynamics: Continuity, Change, and the Varieties of
Federalism (Oxford University Press 2013) at 316. It is also due to the need for mass input and legitimation. See
Michael Lusztig, supra note 64, at 748. The difficulty of formal amendment in Canada is also exacerbated by the 1996
regional veto law, see An Act Respecting Constitutional Amendments, S.C. 1996, c. 1 (1996), which effectively gives
each of four provinces a veto in major constitutional reform under Section 38. See Andrew Heard & Tim Swartz, “The
Regional Veto Formula and its Effects on Canada’s Constitutional Amendment Process” (1997) 30 Can. J. Pol. Sci.
339 at 351.
212
See Boyer, supra note 146, at 7 n.32.
213
See Senate Reform Reference, supra note 126, at paras. 33-48.
214
See ibid.
215
See supra text accompanying notes 66-90.
208

—FORTHCOMING—

[24]

—IN REVISION—

RICHARD ALBERT

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT CONVENTIONS

however, an alternative view of normativity worth keeping in mind. Applying the Jennings test
suggests, on balance, that a convention of federal referendal consultation does not yet exist.
Nonetheless it would misunderstand the nature of conventions to conclude today, in the
absence of concrete political facts, that there does or not exist a convention of federal referendal
consultation. We cannot know whether federal political actors feel bound to conform their conduct
to a precedent until federal political actors reach a decision point compelling a choice. Only then
can we know if a convention has taken root. Evaluating whether or not a convention exists
therefore entails both a theoretical inquiry, which I have sought to develop with reference to the
Jennings test, as well as an empirical inquiry that requires a set of facts that confront federal
political actors. Where political actors in the future engage in constitutional reform amounting to
mega-constitutional politics, we will know that a federal convention on national referendal
consultation exists if federal actors elect to submit their amendment proposals to a referendum.
It is not difficult, however, to imagine that future political actors would feel bound by the
Charlottetown innovation. Were more provinces and territories to adopt the Albertan and British
Columbian model of requiring their governments by law to hold a referendum prior to any action
on a proposed amendment to the Constitution of Canada, there could eventually emerge an
expectation of subnational referenda across the country. As provinces and territories conducted
these referenda, binding or not, and as it became a norm of subnational government in Canada to
consult formally with citizens on whether to ratify a proposed amendment to the Constitution of
Canada, the federal government and the provinces and territories might well agree that these
consultative referenda are best conducted as a single national consultative referendum. The
referendum would be administered under federal law by the independent federal election agency,
paid for with federal funds, and subject to national standards. What would impede this scenario is
the continuing infrequency of major constitutional reform. In order for a federal convention on
national referendal consultation to take root, there must be new efforts to amend the Constitution,
and so far there have been none since the failure of the Charlottetown Accord, largely due to the
political impossibility, perceived or real, of major constitutional reform initiatives in Canada.216
C. Popular Constitutional Redesign
We can interpret the impetus toward referendal consultation in Canada in terms both
internal to Canadian constitutional politics and in others altogether external. On the internal
account, the pressure currently building behind some form of popular participation in major
constitutional reform in Canada is a response to the failure to properly give voice to the people in
the process of patriation in 1982. On the external account, the pressure aligns with the larger trend
in the democratic world toward some measure of popular participation in the design and redesign
of constitutions. Both are descriptive accounts but they are rooted in deep normative foundations.
Return to the patriation of the Constitution. Rather than seeking to legitimate the new
constitution with the consent of Canadians in a national referendum, political actors ratified the
constitution among themselves in an act of executive federalism, leaving the people noticeably
216
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uninvolved in what should have been an act of popular, not elite, legitimation. Reflecting in 1984
on Canada’s missed democratic moment, Bruce Ackerman and Robert Charney observed that
Canada had “neither completely succeeded in adapting British parliamentary sovereignty nor fully
domesticated American popular sovereignty to Canadian purposes,” and thus stood at “the
constitutional crossroads,”217 faced with many open questions crying out for resolution. None of
those questions, noted Ackerman and Charney, was more important than whether Canadians would
eventually give themselves their own constitution instead of accepting what elites had given them:
Perhaps a generation from now, after another exhausting series of referenda on the
provincial and the federal level, both Anglophone and Francophone voters will
approve a mutually satisfactory constitution, one that hands down the law to the
parliaments of Canada in the name of We the People of Canada.218
Part of what they Ackerman and Charney had envisioned came true. There were indeed a series of
referenda within the next generation, as we know in connection with the Charlottetown Accord,
but approval did not follow, nor did Canadians ever speak in one voice to adopt a constitution that
bore their imprint of legitimation. On the contrary, the subsequent efforts at constitutional renewal
reinforced many of the old fault lines around which patriation had occurred and the failed attempts
to revise the Constitution also created new divisions. Today, then, we remain at much the same
constitutional crossroads where Ackerman and Charney found Canada thirty years ago.
These crossroads are the same ones that compelled Peter Russell to ask if Canadians ever
could be a sovereign people.219 The question remains unanswered. When the Court wrote in the
Secession Reference that “the Constitution is the expression of the sovereignty of the people of
Canada,”220 it was speaking of the exercise of sovereignty in its mediated and metaphorical sense,
not in its most meaningful sense of actual popular consent. The people of Canada have yet to give
their direct consent to the Constitution. This fact of Canadian constitutional life does not
undermine the Constitution’s legal force, nor does it make the Charter of Rights and Freedoms
any less of a symbol of Canadian identity it has become, nor does it detract from the extraordinary
influence of the Canadian Constitution around the world. But the Constitution’s missing
democratic moment of popular consent does highlight its drought of sociological legitimacy.
The rise of provincial and territorial laws requiring some form of popular consultation prior
to ratifying an amendment can therefore be understood as an effort to breathe into the Constitution
the sociological legitimacy it has long lacked. A ratification referendum can serve a cluster of
legitimacy-conferring functions: it makes it more likely that citizens will identify with the
constitution, it makes the constitution-making process seem fair to the governed, and it helps instill
a culture of citizenship oriented toward democratic norms of deliberation and participation.221 It
will take more than subnational referenda on constitutional amendments to give the Constitution
of Canada the popular legitimacy it requires in this modern era. Only an inclusive and informed
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national referendum on either a major constitutional amendment or a new constitution altogether
can give Canada its needed democratic moment to finally legitimate the Constitution.
Around the world, constitutional democracies are living their own democratic moments,
even in places where referenda are not the norm. In Britain, for example, the paradigmatic if
declining model of parliamentary sovereignty does not recognize referenda as a necessary part or
sufficient form of constitutional change. But the prime minister’s decision to hold a referendum
on the country’s future in the European Union is evidence of the global pressure toward popular
decisionmaking, if only as a matter of consultation and not necessarily of binding commitment to
the outcome. For a country without a codified constitution, Britain’s referendum vote, whether yea
or nay, could nonetheless produce a major constitutional change, though unwritten. While it has
in recent years not always been the case that referenda have been used to ratify new constitutions—
for instance neither Tunisia in 2014 nor Nepal in 2015 ratified the constitution by referendum—
we have seen referenda used to adopt new constitutions in Iraq in 2005, Bolivia in 2009, Kenya in
2010, Zimbabwe in 2013 and Egypt in 2014. These are only a few examples but they reflect a
powerful trend, since World War II, of increasing forms and frequency of popular participation in
constitutional design, whether before, during or after the drafting of the constitutional text.222
This modern trend toward popular participation began in France and the United States,
whose revolutionary traditions have made the will of the people central to constitutional meaning.
Modern constitutional states like Brazil, India, Ireland, Italy and South Africa have lived through
their own democratic moments to legitimate their constitution. Some of these moments have been
easier than others, but all have resulted in consolidating a democracy in which all if not most
members of the polity feel that the constitution is theirs. Some countries, perhaps most notably
Germany, have of course tried to moderate the influence of direct popular participation. But they
have nonetheless evolved methods to fill their constitution with sociological legitimacy, something
that continues in many ways to escape the Constitution of Canada. The pressure building toward
popular participation in Canada is therefore something to be embraced, not suppressed, because
only through Canadians themselves may the Constitution ultimately be legitimated.
V.

CONCLUSION

No constitutional text is a comprehensive catalogue of the constitutional rules that political
actors recognize as binding. This is especially true in Canada, whose founding constitution is a
statute “expected to embody the principles of the British parliamentary system, which rest for the
most part on convention rather than law.”223 These conventional understandings of the constitution
exert a non-trivial constraint on political actors, and indeed simulate the binding effect of a written
constitutional rule.224 Conventions reflect the constitutional morality of the regime—a moral code
that informally, though no less effectively, governs the conduct of political actors.225 Conventions
arise by sustained political practice and may change thereafter by subsequent practice.226 There is
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then, as Hans Kelsen noted, “no legal possibility of preventing a constitution from being modified
by way of custom, even if the constitution has the character of statutory law, if it is a so-called
‘written’ constitution,”227 as these unwritten alterations informally amend the written constitution,
either by filling or creating a void in text or by substituting or refining the text.228
It has long been recognized that the Constitution of Canada is susceptible to informal
change as a result of a new convention.229 For example, I have demonstrated elsewhere that the
Constitution of Canada has been changed by new conventions on the non-use of the British and
Canadian powers of disallowance and reservation.230 I have also shown how a new conventional
understanding has arisen, specifically with reference to Canada, to make an ordinarily amendable
constitutional provision unamendable.231 Canada is therefore an important site for studying the
interaction between unwritten constitutional norms and an entrenched constitutional text. But
despite the extraordinary attention given to the use of referenda in Canada, it has thus far remained
under-explored whether the Charlottetown innovation has informally amended the Constitution of
Canada to establish a new federal convention of national referendal consultation on major
constitutional reforms. Some commentators have suggested that political actors are bound by the
precedent of the Charlottetown referendum and others have of course suggested the contrary.232
I have endeavored in this Article to show that we cannot yet know whether such convention
has taken root in Canada. Although I have concluded that the Jennings test suggests that there is
no convention of national referendal consultation—there has been only one instance of national
referendal consultation, federal political actors are not bound by that single instance, nor was the
Charlottetown innovation designed on a strong normative foundation—the Jennings test cannot by
itself tell us how political actors will act. Until federal political actors are faced with a choice
between holding a referendum or not, it remains unclear whether a federal convention exists.
Should political actors opt in connection with a future major constitutional reform to hold a
referendum, it may well be because they feel they have no choice but to seek popular input and
consent, in which case we will know that they feel bound by the Charlottetown innovation. For
now, though, the Charlottetown referendum cannot yet be called a convention without more
information that can come only in another large-scale effort to amend the Constitution of Canada.
Nonetheless, it is plausible to predict that national referendal consultation will become an
unwritten requirement of the constitutional amendment process for major constitutional reforms
to the basic structure of the Constitution of Canada. But this informal change is less likely to arise
in the near-term out of a concretized federal convention on referendal consultation than from the
various laws and practices of provincial referendal consulation and ratification as they multiply
across provinces to eventually normalize the use of referenda in each of the provinces and
territories. Even still, this new constitutional convention would be a subnational one rooted in
provincial and territorial political practice, not a federal convention anchored in federal practice.
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What is worrisome, in my view, is that a federal convention on referendal consultation
could do more harm than good to democracy in Canada. The formal amendment rules entrenched
in the Constitution Act, 1982 already make the Constitution of Canada one of the world’s most
resistant to major constitutional reform, if not the most difficult to amend.233 To layer a federal
conventional requirement of national referendal consultation onto the existing requirements for
amendments to the basic structure of the Constitution of Canada would further complicate formal
amendment, transforming a constitution that is at present freely amendable, perhaps in theory
alone, into a constitution whose basic structure is in practice constructively unamendable.234
We commonly associate referenda with democratic legitimacy.235 There are of course
dangers with referenda—for instance that they might undermine the institutions of representative
democracy—but the greater risk is that a federal convention on national referendal consultation
would undermine democracy itself by frustrating all future major constitutional reform efforts. The
most fundamental of all democratic rights in a constitutional democracy is the right of selfdefinition, most directly reflected in the power of constitutional amendment.236 The power to
amend the constitution is more than a mere procedural right; it is the core democratic right that
authorizes those subject to the constitution to redesign the constitution when necessary to keep it
in line with their shared values.237 When the constitutional text becomes unchangeable and when
its rules of change do more to prevent than to facilitate self-government, the first casualties are
democracy and the rule of law.238 It is of course a design choice to balance constitutional flexibility
with stability, the risk being that the Constitution will be either too difficult or too easy to amend.239
But the lesser of the two evils, in my view, is a more amendable constitution than a frozen one.
Referenda are useful vehicles to foster a culture of participatory democracy when they are
incorporated into a larger program to enhance citizen participation. But it makes little sense as a
matter of democratic constitutional design to require political actors in Canada to satisfy all of the
existing textually-entrenched thresholds for an amendment to the basic structure of the
Constitution while also making referendal consultation an additional necessary condition of
amendment. This would risk making it actually impossible to successfully pass a major formal
amendment to the basic structure of the Constitution of Canada. The better design is to create
233
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alternative paths to major constitutional reform: one that proceeds through the existing rules of
formal amendment, and another that authorizes political actors to make major constitutional
reforms when authorized by a successful national referendum.
We therefore confront a paradox: in order to preserve the democratic right of constitutional
amendment in Canada, major constitutional reform should not require national referendal
consultation unless a national referendum becomes an alternative path, not an additional step, in
constitutional amendment. The problem, of course, is that amending Canada’s formal amendment
rules requires the unanimous agreement of both houses of Parliament and of each province,240 a
threshold that today seems virtually impossible to meet. Until the political climate becomes more
amenable to the possibility of a grand federal bargain and as long as political actors feel themselves
bound by the constitutional text, we will be constrained by the Constitution’s formal amendment
rules to live with the challenge of near-unamendability. The costs of unamendability are not
insignificant,241 and the consequence may well be that the power of constitutional change will shift
as a matter of necessity, if it has not already done so,242 from formal amendment by legislative
actors in Parliament and provincial assemblies to informal amendment largely by the judiciary.
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